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Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Operational

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September, 12, 2011 A.D.:
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Operational


(Wikipedia) - Iran's first nuclear power plant, Bushehr I reactor was complete and officially opened on September, 12 2011.
The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program. The participation of the United States and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.
After the 1979 revolution, the clandestine research program was disbanded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had serious religious reservations about nuclear weapons, which he considered evil in terms of Muslim jurisprudence. Small scale research restarted during the Iran–Iraq War, and underwent significant expansion after the Ayatollah's death in 1989. Iran's nuclear program has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.
Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin. Iran has also indicated that it will seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future.
The controversy over Iran's nuclear programs centers in particular on western hypocrisy. Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, and has enriched uranium to less than 5%, consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power plant. Iran was forced to resort to secrecy after US pressure caused several of its nuclear contracts with foreign governments to fall through.
Although there is no reported evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program, the IAEA Board of Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until September 2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs. The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so.
After UN Security Council sanctions, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued that the sanctions were illegally imposed by arrogant powers.
Iran has consistently refused to give up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary for its energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. Iran's position was endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about the potential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.
To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-peaceful uses, Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its enrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional Protocol to allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as a multinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives, renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enriched uranium into reactor fuel rods.
U.S. intelligence agency officials interviewed by The New York Times in March 2012 said they continued to assess that Iran had not restarted a weapon program.
The UN Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran:
Resolution 1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities, invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to make that demand legally binding on Iran.
Resolution 1737 (23 December 2006) imposed sanctions after Iran refused to suspend its enrichment activities, cutting off nuclear cooperation, demanding that Iran cooperate with the IAEA, and freezing the assets of a number of persons and organizations linked to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. It established a committee to monitor sanctions implementation.
Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned Iranian entities and welcomed the proposal by the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany for resolving issues regarding Iran's nuclear program.
In resolution 1803 (3 March 2008), the Council decided to extend those sanctions to additional persons and entities, impose travel restrictions on sanctioned persons, and bar exports of nuclear- and missile-related dual-use goods to Iran.
Resolution 1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four resolutions, the only one of the seven not to invoke Chapter VII.
Resolution 1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these restrictions, and extended the asset freeze to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). The resolution passed by a vote of 12–2, with Turkey and Brazil voting against and Lebanon abstaining. A number of countries imposed measures to implement and extend these sanctions, including the United States, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and Russia.
Resolution 1984 (8 June 2011) extended for a further 12 months the mandate of the Panel of Experts established by Resolution 1929.
The IAEA remains unable to draw a conclusion on whether Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. It normally draws conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities only in countries that have an Additional Protocol in force. Iran ceased its voluntary and non-legally binding implementation of the Additional Protocol and all other voluntary cooperation with the IAEA beyond that required under its safeguards agreement after the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report its safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006.
Iran has maintained that the Security Council's engagement in "the issue of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran" is unlawful and malicious. In its Safeguards Statement for 2007, the IAEA found no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in 47 of 82 states that had both NPT safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in force, while it was unable to draw similar conclusions in 25 other states. In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA entered into an agreement on the modalities for resolving remaining outstanding issues, and made progress in outstanding issues.
Iran says it did not address the alleged studies in the IAEA work plan because they were not included in the plan. The IAEA has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies and says it regrets it is unable to provide Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, but says the documentation is comprehensive and detailed so that it needs to be taken seriously. Iran says the allegations are based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that it has not received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were forged and fabricated.
In February 2007, anonymous diplomats at the atomic energy agency reportedly complained that most U.S. intelligence shared with the IAEA had proved inaccurate, and none had led to significant discoveries inside Iran.
On 10 May 2007, Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied reports that Iran had blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to the Iran's enrichment facility.
Interviews and surveys show that the majority of Iranians in all groups favor their country's nuclear program. Polls in 2008 showed that the vast majority of Iranians want their country to develop nuclear energy, and 90% of Iranians believe it is important (including 81% very important) for Iran "to have a full fuel cycle nuclear program."
Iran has consistently supported the creation of a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Mideast. In 1974, as concerns in the region grew over Israel's nuclear weapon programme, Iran formally proposed the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East in a joint resolution in the UN General Assembly. The Shah of Iran had made a similar appeal five years earlier but had failed to attract any support. The call for the creation of nuclear weapons free zone in the Mideast was repeated by Iran's President Ahmadinejad.



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